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NOTES
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CRIMINAL
LAW: A PENETRABLE BARRIER TO PROSECUTION
A criminal statute of limitations, in barring prosecution after the pas-
sage of a stated period of time, is an act of grace 1 representing a legislative
determination that the purposes of the criminal law may best be served
under some circumstances by limiting the power to proceed against an
alleged criminal. Absent such a statute a criminal act may be the basis
of a prosecution at any time after its commission.2 Since law enforcement
ordinarily requires the prosecution of those who commit criminal acts, why
are such legislative limitations imposed? If there are valid reasons for
these concessions to alleged criminals, is current legislation in accord with
those reasons? It is the purpose of this Note to examine the bases for
enactment of statutes of limitations in criminal law, and to indicate certain
problems and inconsistencies arising from the current status of these stat-
utes in the United States.
The doctrine that no lapse of time bars the King (nullum tempus
occurrit regi) 3 has prevailed in England to the extent that there are rela-
tively few statutes imposing time limitations on criminal prosecutions in
English law.4 This doctrine has won little, if any, acceptance in other
1. Davenport v. State, 20 Okla. Crim. 253, 270, 202 Pac. 18, 24 (1921);
Commonwealth v. Foster, 111 Pa. Super. 451, 456, 170 Ati. 691, 692 (1934). Some
authorities refer to the statutes as acts of "amnesty." 1 WHARTON, CRIMINA.
PROCEDURE 415 (10th ed., Kerr, 1918); Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 256, 177
N.E. 489, 493 (1931). See also People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 420, 156 N.E. 303, 304
(1927): "Statutes of limitations in criminal cases differ from such statutes in civil
cases, in that in the latter they are statutes of repose while in the former they
create a bar to prosecution."
2. 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 414; CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 149
(2d ed., Mikell, 1918); ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN
CRIMINAL CASES 53 (31st ed., Butler and Garsia, 1943); see 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 1, 2 (1883) for examples of old English cases
in which prosecution was begun many years after the commission of the crime.
3. ARCHBOLD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 53; KENNEY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW
§639 (Turner ed. 1952).
4. The major crimes that are subject to a limitation in England are:
a. Treason-3 years generally. Treason Act, 1695, 7 WILL. 3, c. 3, § 5; see
7 ANN., c. 21 (1708).
b. Carnally knowning a female 13-16 years old-1 year. Criminal .Law
Amendment Acts, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 69, § 5; Criminal Law
Amendment Acts, 1885 to 1925, 18 & 19 GEo. 5, c. 42, § 41.
c. Offenses punishable under Summary Jurisdiction Act--6 months. Sum-
mary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vicr., c. 43, § 11.
d. Income Tax Act Violations--6 years generally. Income Tax Act, 1918,
8 & 9 GEo. 5, c. 40, §§ 221(3), (4).
e. Summary proceedings for perjury-1 year. Criminal Justice Act, 1925,
15 & 16 GEo. 5, c. 86, §28(3).
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countries. The civil law jurisdictions derive their criminal statutes of
limitations from Roman Law which set a twenty year period after which
liability for a crime was extinguished.5 The modern statutes of the civil
law countries are similar to those now prevailing in the United States in
that they generally provide the longest period of limitation for the most
serious offense.0
The English policy of limited use of statutes of limitations has never
been widely followed in the United States where criminal statutes of limita-
tions made their appearance in the colonies as early as 1652.7 Such statutes
were adopted for most crimes in the federal system in 1790 8 and have per-
For other crimes see 9 HALsuuY, LAws OF ENGLAND 82, n.p. (2d ed. 1933).
Formerly all actions on penal statutes where a forfeiture limited to the king was
involved were subject to a statute of limitations. 31 ELiz., c. 5, § 5 (1589). This
section was repealed by the Limitations Act of 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. 6, c. 21, § 34 (1939).
It should also be noted that this statute did not apply to common law crimes, being
limited by its terms to actions on penal statutes. See generally, ESPINASSE, LAW
OF ACTIONS ON PENAL STATUTES 71 et seq. (1st Am. ed. 1822).
Apparently no authoritative discussions exist as to why the use of criminal
statutes of limitations is so restricted in England. It may be that the English have
never felt any need for such statutes, or believe that certain characteristics of their
criminal law procedure eliminate any need Which might exist elsewhere. For ex-
ample, English prosecutors are not employed solely as prosecutors and political
careers are rarely dependent upon their success; as a result there may be a more
careful weeding out of evidence in England. See generally, HOWARD, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND (1931).
5. Murray, The Prescription of Crime, 50 ScoT. L. REv. 259 (1934).
6. E.g., In the French Code the period of limitation for prosecution of different
crimes depends upon a distinction similar to the American felony-misdemeanor
classification, adding as a third group "contravention de police," or petty misde-
meanors. There is an additional limitation on commencement of punishment, which
begins to run from the day on which a final, non-appealable sentence is imposed;
if punishment is not begun during this period, the offender's liability is extinguished.
CODE D'INsTRUcTIoN CRMINELLE, Art. 634-643 (1808). In Italy the period re-
quired to bar prosecution is equal to the maximum prison sentence for the crime.
However, the Italian Code provides more differentiation than is found in the United
States, within the felony-misdemeanor classifications. See text at note 30 infra.
PENAL CODE OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY, Art. 157-161 (1930). See also GERMAN
PENAL CODE OF 1871, as amended 1950, § 67; CODE PENAL SuIssE Art. 70-72
(1951). See the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., Part 111, §8 (1937), as quoted
in DEssioN, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTAT ON AND PuBLIC ORm 618 (1948);
"In the event of a concrete act, which at the time it was committed was a
crime . . . but by the time it was investigated or examined in court lost its socially
dangerous character owing to a change in the criminal law or merely a change in
the social-political conditions, or in the event the person who committed it cannot
in the view of the court be any longer regarded as socially dangerous at that moment,
the act shall not entail any measures of social defense against the person who com-
mitted it."
7. WHITMIORE, COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 163 (1889) (one year general
limitation on crimes). See also CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYL-
VANIA 1682-1700 173-4 (George, Neod, and McComant, 1879) (1684 statute prohibit-
ing offenses against the Governor provided a six month limitation).
The far more extensive use of statutory limitations here than in England may
have resulted from the fact that early in the development of American law there
was a contest between the civil and common law for acceptance in the colonies.
HoWE, READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 19 et seq. (1949); RADIN, ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY § 79 (1936). Probably in this area the civil law was
accepted. Cf., Hasklins, A Problem of the Reception of the Common Law in the
Colonial Period, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 842 (1949).
8. 1 LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 113, §32 (1789-91).
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sisted there ever since.9 Today, limitations are applied to most crimes by
all but a few states,1° although the most serious crimes are frequently
excepted. 1
PURPOSES
Criminal statutes of limitations ostensibly serve several purposes, all
of which relate to the efficacy of criminal law administration. Since relevant
legislative history is meagre,' 2 it should be noted that although the follow-
ing purposes may be achieved by the statutes, such purposes did not neces-
sarily motivate legislative enactment.
The most important reason for statutes of limitations is to protect the
accused from the burden of defending himself against charges of long-
completed misconduct.' 3 As time passes, witnesses upon whom the de-
fendant may need to rely die or move away; events are forgotten and
records lost, particularly if the events seemed unimportant at the time of
occurrence.
"Statutes of limitation are founded upon the liberal theory that pros-
ecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the
government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to
the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond
availability." 14
Even where the defendant is guilty, circumstances which, at the time of
commission, tend to mitigate his sentence, such as an adverse economic
situation, fade into unimportance. While some of these factors are simi-
larly detrimental to a delayed prosecution, it must be remembered that it
is the prosecutor who exercises the option to proceed to trial.
Closely related to the protection of the defense as a purpose of limita-
tions statutes is the desire to insure that criminal prosecution will be based
on evidence that is reasonably fresh and therefore more trustworthy than
evidence with a probative value which has grown weaker as man's ability
to remember has become impaired. 15
".. . the very existence of the statute is a recognition by the legis-
lature of the fact that time gradually wears out proofs of innocence
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 et seq. (1946).
10. See text following note 29 infra; South Carolina and Wyoming have no
statutes of limitations. The following states have no limitation for felonies: Kentucky,
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia.
11. See text at and following note 33 infra.
12. E.g., 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 1547; see also note 104 infra.
13. See CHAFE, THmTY-FivE YEARS wrH FEmDOm OF SPEEC H 28 (1952). The
importance of this factor received recognition early in English history. See 7
WIL. 3, c. 3 (1695) ; 32 HEN. 8, c. 9 (1540).
14. United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D.N.J. 1942).
15. See text following note 44 infra.
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and a notification that a fixed and positive period established by it
destroys all proofs of guilt." 16
It should be noted, however, that a statute of limitations is no assur-
ance as to time of trial, since the finding of an indictment tolls the running
of the statute but does not determine when trial will be held.
17 It is at
this point that the constitutional right to a speedy trial,'
8 often augmented
by specific statutes,19 supplements the aim of the limitation.
2P
It has been suggested that statutes of limitations also aid the state in
checking upon its officials by requiring vigilance on their part in discovering
law-violators and bringing them to justice as speedily as possible.
21 If
limitations do bring to bear upon police and prosecutors more pressures
than are caused by a citizenry aroused by recent crimes, it may be argued
that these pressures are ineffective since present prosecutors are already
overburdened with restrictions on personnel and finances. However, this
problem should be remedied by improving prosecution facilities rather than
by withholding the limitation.
The state should be most interested in punishing recent crimes, and
the statutes tend, depending on the length of the period, to insure that this
aim will be achieved.2 It should be remembered that an individual who
has committed criminal acts in the past and is still continuing to do so is
committing recent crimes for which the statutes are no bar to prosecution.
16. People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 421, 156 N.E. 303, 304 (1927). See also Hogo-
boom v. State, 120 Neb. 525, 527, 234 N.W. 422, 423 (1931); People ex rel.
Reibman v. Warden of the County Jail at Salem, N. Y., 242 App. Div. 282, 284,
275 N.Y. Supp. 59, 62 (3d Dep't 1934).
17. See text at note 94 infra.
18. See e.g., U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. VI; PA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9; N.J. CoNsT.
Art. 1, §8; OHIO CoNsT. Art. I, §10.
19. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit 19, § 781 (Purdon 1930) (trial must be within
two terms of court after indictment); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901 (1935); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:318 et seq. (West 1951).
20. In United States v. McWilliams, 69 F. Supp. 812, 815 (D.D.C. 1946), the
court said: "As in all long delayed cases, the witnesses now are scattered; some are
not accessible, more particularly to the defendants. . . the memories of witnesses
as to events occuring many years ago are not clear. It is for those reasons among
others that the Constitution of the United States has imposed [a] Statute of Limita-
tions to prevent long delayed prosecutions. I do not see how these defendants now
can possibly obtain fair trials." Aff'd and quoted in United States v. McWilliams
163 F.2d 695, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also United States v. Cadau, 197 U.S.
475 (1905) ; Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
Note that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is considered a personal one
which may be waived by defendant's failure to demand prompt action. Collins
v. United States, 157 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1946).
The right to a speedy trial after indictment was recognized at an early date in
England. See Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 CAP- 2, c. 2, § 7.
21. 1 WH RToN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 367 (10th ed., Kerr, 1918). One author
has suggested that the deterrent effect of punishment is directly related to the speed
with which criminals are brought to trial; the less time the criminal has to enjoy
the fruits of his crime, the less desirable will criminal conduct appear to the potential
criminal. See HowARD, CRiMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 128, n.44 (1931).
22. BECCAmIA, CRsS AND PUNISHmENTS 74 (2d Am. ed. 1819); Stallybrass,
A Comparison of Criminal Law in England in 4 ENGLISH STUDIES IN CRIMINAL
SCIENCE 390, 443 (1945).
634 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
On the other hand, those persons who have committed crimes in the distant
past and have not repeated their errors are apparently self-rehabilitated and
as a result seem to offer little cause for fear as to their future conduct. The
pursuit of only more recent criminals is consistent with that aim of criminal
law which seeks to rehabilitate wrongdoers and serves to free the citizen
from vexatious fear of prosecution for old crimes. The criminal who
has avoided prosecution for several years and who seeks to rehabilitate
himself would be encouraged in this objective by the assurance that what-
ever progress he makes will not be shattered by enforcement of some long
dormant claim of the state to his freedom.2 4
This security afforded by the statutes is only security from prosecution
for crimes. There remains the possibility of public degradation by the
disclosure of old crimes and the association of individuals with those crimes.
The statutes, of course, do not prevent this sort of activity but as a matter
of practice law enforcement officials rarely turn to the investigation and dis-
closure of crimes which cannot be the basis of convictions.
Although commentators have apparently offered no reasons for op-
posing statutes of limitations in the criminal law, there is the possibility
that the stattes may to a certain extent encourage criminal activity by
diminishing the certainty of punishment. There may be a particular danger
that where a first offender's prosecution is barred by a statute, he may be
encouraged to return to criminal activity. With the habitual criminal upon
whom prior legal sanctions have apparently had little effect, perhaps the
criminal law is best served by his removal from society; to the extent that
this is true, and assuming that there is no doubt of guilt, the statute of
limitations is not desirable. Obviously, the statute also prevents realiza-
tion of the state's desire for retribution.
One possible alternative to limitation statutes would be to grant dis-
cretion to either the court or the prosecutor to prohibit or discontinue
prosecution if the interests of justice so dictate. Substantial discretion
exists today in the prosecutor through his ability to refrain from prose-
cuting 2 or to enter a nolle prosequi.2 6 However, the exercise of this dis-
cretion may be colored by political expediency and the desire to obtain as
many convictions as possible. On the other hand, it may be argued that
the desire to prosecute only cases with a reasonable chance for success
23. See Thayer, Schoch, and Ireland, The Effect of a State of War Upon
Statutes of Limitation or Prescription, 17 TULANE L. Rxv. 416 (1943).
24. A much publicized example of the value of an opportunity for self-rehabilita-
tion was the case of one Frank Raboski. After escaping from jail in California,
Raboski went to Illinois and established himself as an outstanding citizen. When
after many years he was finally confronted with the charges against him, the local
citizenry campaigned for clemency because of his value to the community. See
the description of the case in Time, May 11, 1953, p. 24, col. 3.
25. As to criminal liability for improper exercise of this discretion, see State
v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953), 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 547 (1954).
26. See e.g., OHIO GEN. CoDF. ANN. § 13437.32 (Page 1938); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§15-175 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 1801 (1953). At common law the
prosecutor also had this power CLARK, CRIMINAL PRocED R s 154 (Mikell ed.
1918).
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would lead a prosecutor to proceed only when the evidence is not stale,
thus eliminating one need for a statute of limitations; this theory assumes
that juries reject stale evidence. Absent statutory authorization, the court
has no power to direct the entry of a nolle proseqUi._
2 7 Statutory auth riza-
tion to dismiss the action apparently exists only in states having situtes
of limitations,28 but perhaps they could, if utilized in Dlace of statutorv
limitations, produce the desired ends.
THE CURRENT STATUTES
Existing statutes are of three general types: (a) some Provide the
same limitation period for all crimes; 29 most make distinctiong (b) in the
length of the period on the basis of the classifications of feldnies and mis-
demeanors,3 0 or (c) of crimes punishable by death, imnrisdnnient m the
state penitentiary or in the county jail (which distinction is often syn-
onymous with that between felonies and misdemeanors) .81 In other words,
where there are distinctions in the length of the period, their usual basis
is the relative seriousness of the crime involved. As the chart in the ap-
pendix 8 2 indicates, the most frequent period for felonies is three years,
although a number of jurisdictions put no bar on them. Murder is subject
to no limitation in all but one jurisdiction; s arson, rape and forgery are
free from limitation in about one-third of the states, and are subject to a
three year limitation in several others. For robbery, kidnapping, embezzle-
ment, bribery, perjury, and conspiracy about one-third of the states provide
a three year limit, with some states providing no limit on the first three
of these offenses, and only a few states denying any bar on the last three
crimes.
Misdemeanors are generally treated as a group. The longest limita-
tion period for misdemeanors is six years, found in four states; two states
have no bar. Eighteen states provide a one year limit and fourteen, a two
27. State v. Anderson, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174 (1930); See Note, 69
A.L.R. N.S. 240 (1930). But see, Williams v. State, 97 Ga. 398, 23 S.E. 822
(1896) (court ordered a nolle prosequi, one of the factors entering into the decision
being the time lapse involved). However, in some circumstances the sentencing
discretion of the judge is relevant to the problem. See text at note 50 infra.
28. ORE. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 26-2005 (1940); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (Supp.
1953). See State v. Keep, 85 Ore. 265, 166 Pac. 936 (1917); Jones v. Busby, 37
Okla. Cr. 68, 256 Pac. 758 (1927).
29. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. c. 752, §§ 1-5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
c. 62, §§ 501-5 (Corrick 1949). See note 10 supra to the effect that South Carolina
and Wyoming have no statute and that six other states have no limit on felonies.
30. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. §§43-601, 43-602 (1947) (provides a three year
limitation for felonies and one year for all offenses less than felonies) ; AiA. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, §§219-226 (1940).
31. E.g., CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 8871 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
Art. 57, §§11-12 (Flack 1951).
32. See chart, Appendix. Because some states have more than one limitation
for a particular crime, the total numbers used in the text will often exceed forty-
eight.
33. New Mexico has a ten year statute of limitations on murder. See chart,
Appendix.
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year limit. Consistent with the policy of relating the length of the period
to the gravity of the crime, prosecution for conduct which is illegal but
lacking in moral turpitude (e.g., traffic violations) must usually be started
within a period shorter than that for misdemeanors generally.
84
The Federal Code provides a three year limitation on crimes 85 with
the following exceptions: (a) no limitation on capital offenses; "I (b) five
year limitation on Violations of the customs and slave trade laws;7 (c)
one year limitation on criminal contempt charges; 38 (d) ten year limitation
on violations of the naturalization laws.3 9 The new Code of Military
Justice similarly applies the seriousness-of-the-crime criterion. 40 The most
serious crimes from the military standpoint are wartime desertion, war-
time absence without leave, aiding the enemy, mutiny and murder. There
are no limitations on these crimes, but the remaining crimes are given
either a two or three year period depending upon their correspondence to
the civilian law's classification of misdemeanors and felonies.
EVALUATION AND SUGGESTED CRITERIA
In light of the rationale of statutes of limitations, there is little validity
to the policy of relating the statutory period directly to the seriousness of
the crime. Where a crime is especially serious and the punishment is
correspondingly great it would seem particularly important to protect the
defendant's right to garner reliable information for a defense and to prevent
the use of stale evidence against him. It may be argued that in the most
serious crimes with the most severe penalties, the stale evidence problem
is reduced because a jury will scrutinize the evidence most carefully, but
as the seriousness of the crime is increased so too is the likelihood of the
jury's being swayed by emotion rather than logic. Where the security of
a self-rehabilitated citizen is at stake, the more enormous the unpunished
crime, the more the citizen has to fear from a delayed discovery and prose-
cution. In view of the factors weighing against a severity-of-crime ap-
proach to limitations on prosecutions, one is left with the conclusion that
the chief motivation for such an approach is the desire for retribution; the
more serious the crime, the more likely is it that this desire will outweigh
the aims of limitation statutes.
Even assuming that statutes of limitations should be directly related
to the seriousness of the crime involved, adoption of the existing felony-
misdemeanor categories does not satisfactorily delineate the worse from the
34. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 731 (Purdon 1953) (15 day statute of limita-
tions for traffic violations).
35. 18 U.S.C. §3282 (Supp. 1952).
36. Id. at § 3281.
37. Id. at § 3283.
38. Id. at §3285.
39. Id. at § 3291.
40. UNir. CoDE OF MrrARY JusTicz Art. 43, 64 STAT. 121 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§618 (Supp. 1951).
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lesser crimes in all instances. The difficulties inherent in setting up any
felony-misdemeanor classification have resulted in some distinctions which
are at best dubious, and which are anomalous when carried over into stat-
utes of limitations. For example, in Indiana if a public officer is bribed
to procure a state contract, where the bribe was over two hundred dollars,
the crime is a felony subject to a five year limitation, but for a lesser offer
it is a misdemeanor subject to a two year limitation.41 Maryland bases its
limitation periods on place of confinement for conviction of a particular
crime; 42 under this rule an insurance agent who embezzles funds is subject
to imprisonment in the state penitentiary and therefore to no statute of
limitations, while an embezzlement by a transporter of goods, punishable
by confinement in jail, is subject to a one year limitation.4
Instead of strict adherence to the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy in
setting limitations on prosecution, there should be an attempt to weigh all
factors which may affect the achievement of the aims of limitations stat-
utes. Whether or not seriousness of the crime continues to be a factor
because of the desire for retribution, other considerations should be taken
into account. Legislators, in determining a particular limitation for a
particular crime, should base the statutory period for the crime primarily
upon the length of time during which the facts constituting the elements
of the crime can be accurately ascertained, bearing in mind the time needed
to discover and investigate the crime as promptly as possible.
Relbility of Evidence
Authorities on the law of evidence 4 and psychologists recognize that
there is a relation between the passage of time and the extent 4 and ac-
curacy 46 of memory. Since the rate of forgetting depends upon variants
such as the degree of learning,47 it is impossible to say that the passage of
any particular length of time renders evidence unreliable. Nevertheless, the
continuous nature of oblivescence serves to justify the application of stat-
utory limitations on prosecution. On the other hand, there are some crimes
in which memory is not so important a factor as in the usual case, because
41. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-304, 10-603 (Burns 1942).
42. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws Art. 57, § 11 (Flack 1951). See text at note
31 supra.
43. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws Art. 27, §§ 156, 158 (Flack 1951).
44. See 3 WiGmORE, EvDENcE §745 (3d ed. 1940) (memoranda not made
shortly after a transaction are inadmissible in court) ; Hutchins and Slesinger, Some
Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARv. L. REv. 860 (1928).
45. EBBINGHAUS, MEMioR (Ruger's transl. 1913) ; Strong, The Effect of Time-
Interval Upon Recognition Memory,'20 PSYCH. REV. 339 (1913). See generally,
ARNOLD, PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LEGAL EViDENCE 167 (2d ed. 1913). The dates
of the psychological studies indicate the need for modern research in the area.
Up to date memory data could be a valuable aid in adjusting limitations statutes to
the reliability of evidence.
46. Dallenbach, The Relation of Memory Error to Time Interval, 20 PSYcH.
REV. 323 (1913).
47. MuNN, PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1951). See also HUSBAND, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY
444 (1941).
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the crimes are evidenced by written matter. These crimes might include
bank embezzlements, tax frauds, or prosecutions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.48 In setting limitations for such crimes the fact that the
use of stale evidence by the prosecution is not an acute problem should be
taken into account. However, other dangers of delayed prosecution must
be considered, such as the difficulty of making a defense which may not be
based on written evidence.
Subsidiary to the factor of guaranteeing the reliability of evidence is
the problem of the self-rehabilitated individual. Since society may have
more to lose than to gain in prosecuting a criminal who is unlikely to
commit another crime, it is desirable to bar prosecution where there is a
strong probability that self-rehabilitation has taken place. If it could be
ascertained that abstinence from crime for a given length of time is a
reliable indication of rehabilitation, this fact might be taken into considera-
tion in enacting statutes of limitations. However, there have been no
scientific studies of "self-rehabilitation" 49 and it is doubtful whether any
formula could ever be devised to gauge the length of time within which
it is probable that a person is rehabilitated.* The importance of this con-
sideration is reduced by the fact that a statutory period short enough to
insure the use of reliable evidence would, in most cases, adequately safe-
guard the self-rehabilitated individual. In the case of the occasional crim-
inal who has "gone straight" even before the expiration of such a statutory
period, the discretionary powers of the prosecutor and the sentencing judge
should be utilized to save the accused from prison.50
Although the heart of an intelligently formulated statute of limitations
must be the calculation of time periods based on the exclusion of stale
evidence, no limitation can be set without regard to the length of time
reasonably necessary to discover and investigate crimes. It is obvious that
the shorter the amount of time from the commission of a crime to prosecu-
tion, the more reliable will be the evidence; it is also obvious that too short
a period of time may preclude discovery and effective investigation.
Time Necessary for Discovery and Investigation
In determining the time ordinarily requisite for investigation, factors
such as the difficulty of identifying suspects should be considered. For
48. The written evidence in a bank embezzlement prosecution would probably
include cancelled checks, drafts, bank books and records. Similarly, in a case
involving tax frauds, the evidence would center around accountant's records, cash
receipts, and vouchers. Where the Fair Labor Sfandards Act, 52 STAT. 1068
(1938), 29 U.S.C. §215 (1946), as amended, 63 STAT. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C.
§215 (Supp. 1952), is involved, written evidence such as records of employment
hours and wages, payroll checks and receipts is important.
49. However, there have been some studies in the related area of recidivism.
For a review of these see Monachesi, American Studies in the Prediction of
Recidivism, 41 J. Cam. L. & CRImiNOLOGY 268 (1951).
50. On the scope and abuse of the judge's sentencing discretion, see Note, 101
U. OF PA. L. REv. 257 (1952). As to the prosecutor's discretion, see text at notes
25 and 26 supra. The powers of the Governor and the Board of Pardons are also
relevant to rehabilitation, but these come into play after the criminal has been sent
to prison.
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example, crimes in which the victim is confronted by the criminal, such
as attempted bribery, extortion or robbery, should require shorter periods
of investigation than burglary or arson.' Records of effective law en-
forcement agencies could provide information about reasonable investigative
periods.
Concealed Crimes
Another important factor which should be considered in establishing
the length of time allowable for prosecution is whether the nature of a
particular crime (as distinguished from the efforts of the criminal) makes
detection especially difficult. Although some statutes provide exceptions
which toll their running as a result of the concealed nature of the crime or
concealment of the commission of the crime by the offender,aa generally the
matter has been given little attention. Certain crimes such as embezzlement
and conspiracy are inherently concealed ones and would therefore seem to
warrant special attention.
Em bezzlement:-As with most other crimes the states base the period
of limitation for embezzlement on the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy. The
determination of whether embezzlement is a felony or misdemeanor usually
turns on the person doing the embezzling or the amount that is taken. In
the case of public officials in the course of their official duties the offense is
generally a felony without regard to the amount taken.53 For such persons
statutory provisions sometimes exist which delay commencement of the
period either until the crime is or reasonably should be discovered or until
the official leaves office, at which point discovery should be made.54
When the statute does not so delay commencement of the statutory period,
the case law often produces the same result. For example, under a statute
making it criminal to convert public money entrusted to the custody of a
specified public officer, the court held that the statute began to run not
from the time of the conversion, but from the time of a demand for the funds
by the person authorized to make such a demand. 5
51. See McGuinness v. United States, 77 A.2d 22 (D.C. 1950) in which de-
fendant was charged with passing bad checks to the Government. The court
held that the Wartime Suspension Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. 1952) (see text
at note 105 infra), was not intended to embrace the crime in question. Said the
court, "[The Act's] purpose was to suspend the running of statutes of limitation
applicable to offenses involving the defrauding of the Government. . . . experience
during the first World War showed that many offenses involving fraud on the
Government were barred because they had not been discovered within time to
proscute during the three-year period of limitation. It seems altogether clear that
the passing of bad checks, which may and almost always would be discovered
immediately, does not fall within such purpose." Id. at 25.
52. See e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-601(4) (1953) ; LA. Rzv. STAT. § 15:8 (1951);
see also note 101 infra.
53. See e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-304, 10-1702, 10-1703 (Burns 1942).
54. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 932, § 6 (1944) ; ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 38, § 632(a)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §211 (Purdon Cum.
Supp. 1952).
.55. Commonwealth v. Shoener, 216 Pa. 71, 64 AtI. 890 (1906). Compare United
States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450 (1878).
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Embezzlement by private persons is treated as a more or less serious
crime-with consequent differences in the period of limitations--depending
upon either the capacity in which the individual served or the amount
taken. In specific situations statutes or cases sometimes delay commence-
ment of the period until the individual has ceased to serve in the particular
capacity. For example, in New York, a fiduciary's misappropriation does
not start the statute running until the date on which his accounting is due.5 6
In Wisconsin, embezzlement by a bailee, if not discovered within the bail-
ment period, is subject to prosecution for an additional year after dis-
covery.57 Similar results have been obtained by decisions concerning con-
version by a guardian or attorney.
58
In some instances the problem of concealment is solved not by delaying
the running of the statute but by providing a longer period for certain
concealed crimes. For example, New Jersey imposes a two year limita-
tion on crimes generally"5 but a five year limit on embezzlement by a
public officer or fiduciary. 0 These lengthened provisions are less desirable
than those which delay the running of the period since some embezzlements
are or can be quickly discovered. In such situations, the statutes providing
for unusually long periods are unnecessary, and do not accomplish the
purposes which limitation statutes should serve.
Briber:-In some states distinctions in limitations for bribery arise
from the fact that bribery is classified sometimes as a misdemeanor and
sometimes as a felony, depending on the amount of the bribe 61 or the
person bribed. 2 The statutes take no notice of the fact that bribery is
to some extent a concealed crime and that therefore it would be desirable
to have provisions delaying commencement of the period until discovery
of the act or, in the case of a public official, until he leaves office. Lengthen-
ing the period for all briberies, or for briberies considered especially serious,
is not the best solution to the problem of concealment, since, as with
embezzlement, the crime may be discovered early while the disadvantages
concomitant to delayed prosecutions remain.
Conspiracy:-Conspiracy is treated very much the same in most
states; the most common limitation is three years, the next most common
56. N.Y. Clim. CoDE § 142.
57. Wis. STAT. § 353.23(2) (1951) (one year after discovery with an outside
limit of five years).
58. See Davis v. State, 28 Ala. App. 348, 185 So. 771 (1938) (guardian's em-
bezzlement was not subject to the statute of limitations until after final settlement
and demand for the fund; result is based on the theory that the crime was not the
conversion but the failure to account). See also, Glenn v. State, 72 Okla. Crim.
165, 114 P.2d 192 (1941); State v. Thang, 188 Minn. 224, 246 N.W. 891 (1933);
State v. Locke, 73 W. Va. 713, 81 S.E. 401 (1914).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, c. 159, § 2 (1952).
60. Id. at §3.
61. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-603, 9-304 (Bums 1942).
62. In Ohio, bribery of a juror is a felony (OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 12826
(Page 1938)) but bribery of a juror in a suit before a justice of the peace is a
misdemeanor (Id. at § 12828).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW
two years, and some states have no limitation at all.6 Where distinctions
are drawn, the most prevalent one is between conspiracy to commit a felony
and that to commit a misdemeanor, in each case adopting the limitation
for the substantive crime.64 Similarly, where periods vary with the par-
ticular crime, the conspiracy period is the same as that for the offense which
was the subject of the conspiracy.6
From the evidentiary point of view the analogy made by the statutes
between the substantive crime and the conspiracy to commit it is justified
by the fact that the proof of the conspiracy will be based mainly on proof
of the commission of the crime by several persons, from which an agree-
ment will be inferred. Since, for the most part, the same facts will be used
to prove the conspiracy and the substantive crime, there is no reason for
having a different period for the conspiracy itself. Although the crime of
conspiracy is defined either as the illegal agreement,68 or the agreement
plus an overt act,67 this distinction is not important for the purposes of
present statutes of limitations since the crime is labelled a continuing one for
which the limitation period begins as late as the last act.
Continuing Crimes
Important problems in considering the point at which a criminal limita-
tion statute begins to operate are raised by the doctrine of the "continuing
crime." Generally, a continuing crime is one which consists of a course
of conduct enduring over an extended period of time, as contrasted with
the instantaneous nature of most crimes. Crimes such as embezzlement,6 8
conspiracy,6 9 bigamy,70 nuisance,71 failure to provide support 72 or to
register for the draft 73 have been held to be continuing. The effect of the
63. See chart, Appendix.
64. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (Supp. 1953) ; CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §§ 446,
177 (1935).
65. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 159-3 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152
(Supp. 1953); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11481 et seq., 11063 et seq. (Williams 1934);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-301 et seq., 10-1101 et seq. (Bums 1942).
66. See MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS AnmNIsTRAnTxoN 636
(1940).
67. 18 U.S.C. §37 (Supp. 1952).
68. State v. Thang, 188 Minn. 224, 246 N.W. 891 (1933). But cf. State
v. Marple, 13 N.J. Misc. 793, 181 Atl. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
69. United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939) ; State v. Ellenstein,
121 N.J.L. 304, 2 A.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
70. Cox v. State, 117 Ala. 103, 23 So. 806 (1898); State v. Sloan, 35 Iowa
217, 7 N.W. 516 (1880). Contra: Pitts v. State, 147 Ga. 801, 95 S.E. 706 (1918).
Of course the statutory phrasing is crucial in all cases. Compare People v. Brady,
257 App. Div. 1000, 13 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d Dep't 1939), with Commonwealth v.
Ross, 248 Mass. 15, 142 N.E. 791 (1924).
71. State v. Ireland, 126 NJ.L. 444, 20 A.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1941); State v.
Dry Fork R.R., 50 W. Va. 235, 40 S.E. 447 (1901). Cf., Hull v. London County
Council, [1901] 1 K.B. 580.
72. Richardson v. State, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 534, 109 Atl. 124 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1920) ; Towns v. State, 24 Ga. App. 265, 100 S.E. 575 (1919).
73. Fogel v. United States, 162 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.), cert. deoied, 332 U.S. 791
(1947).
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continuing crime doctrine on the law of criminal limitations is to cause the
statute to run not from the initial act, which may in itself embody all of the
elements of the crime, but from the occurrence of the most recent act. For
example, when bigamy is defined as a continuing crime, the statute of
limitations does not commence from the date of the bigamous marriage
but can commence as late as acts of bigamous cohabitation occur.
74 Simi-
larly, failure to provide support for a spouse or child, since it is a "con-
tinuing crime," will not start the statute running until the last such failure
occurs.
75
Theoretically, the "continuing crime" doctrine is valid in that it is most
often applied to courses of conduct in which each individual act con-
stitutes antisocial behavior. On the other hand, the effect of the doctrine
may be a conflict with the purposes of the statute of limitations since evi-
dence of acts which would ordinarily be barred by the statute are admis-
sible to prove acts which are not so barred. For example, assume that a
statute provides a three year limitation on prosecutions for a certain type
of conspiracy. Assume further a set of circumstances constituting the con-
spiracy occurring in 1950, and acts sufficient to cause the crime to be
"continuing" occurring until 1954 at which time the statute' begins to
operate. Prosecution for the 1954 acts will undoubtedly result in introduc-
tion of evidence of the 1950 acts which, but for the "continuing" nature
of the crime, would have been barred. As to these acts, the purpose of the
statute has been circumvented.
As long as a definite pattern of antisocial behavior is present, however,
the fact that the purpose of the limitation is overcome in some instances,
does not make the "continuing crime" doctrine undesirable. The main
problem is in determining what sort of crimes are "continuing" for pur-
poses of the statutes of limitations; examination of several Supreme Court
decisions may illustrate how that determination is made. In United States
v. Kissel76 the defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to restrain trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.77 Defendants contended that the alleged
conspiracy existed and was complete at the time the agreement to restrain
trade was entered into, that such a conspiracy could not be continuing and
that therefore prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. The
Court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, in holding that a conspiracy could be con-
tinuing up to the period of abandonment 78 or success, stated:
"It is true, that the unlawful agreement satisfies the definition of
the crime, but it does not exhaust it. It also is true, of course, that the
mere continuance of the result of a crime does not continue the crime.
74. See cases cited note 70 supra.
75. See cases cited note 72 supra.
76. 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
78. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); Buhler v. United States,
33 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1929); Eldridge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449 (10th Cir.
1932); United States v. Ames, 39 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW
. . . But when the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous
result that will not continue witlbout the continuous cooperation of the
conspirators . . . and there is such continuous cooperation, it is a
perversion of natural thought and of natural language to call such
continuous cooperation a cinematographic series of distinct conspir-
acies, rather than to call it a single one." 79
In United States v. Irvine 80 the question was whether the crime of
withholding pension funds was a "continuing" one so as to remove the bar
of the statute of limitations. In holding that the crime was complete upon
a refusal to turn over the funds within a reasonable time after demand,
the Court said:
"It is unreasonable to hold that twenty years after this [the orig-
inal refusal upon demand] he can be indicted for wrongfully with-
holding the money, and be put to prove his innocence after his receipt
is lost, and when perhaps the pensioner is dead. . . ." ,
In this case, after originally converting the funds, there was "continuance"
only in the sense that the results of the crime remained after its commis-
sion; to extend the period of limitation under such circunistances would
obviously reduce the statutes to an illusory bar.
That it is not always an easy matter to differentiate between a criminal
act and its results for purposes of the statute of limitations is illustrated by
the case of Pendergast v. United States.8 2 There the defendants, by fraud
and deceit and through the misrepresentations of attorneys, induced the
court to issue decrees effectuating a corrupt settlement of litigation. An
information against defendants was drawn on the theory that the fraudulent
scheme, although commenced beyond the three year period of the statute
of limitations,m continued thereafter. The prosecution contended that
successful execution of the scheme required not only misrepresentations
to the court, but also continuous cooperation in concealing the plan until
the court, by virtue of its decree, had distributed certain impounded monies.
The Supreme Court held the statute to be a bar on the ground that the
prosecution was based on a section of the Judicial Code which created the
power to punish contempts in cases of misbehavior in the presence of the
court,84 and therefore later acts could not make the crime a continuing one,
although they affected court proceedings. The Court noted that the identical
fraudulent scheme would be a continuing crime if prosecution were brought
under a section of -the Criminal Code dealing with corruptly obstructing
the due administration of justice.85
79. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910).
80. 98 U.S. 450 (1878).
81. Id. at 452.
82. 317 U.S. 412 (1943).
83. 19 STAT. 32 (1876), 18 U.S.C. §582 (1940).
84. 36 STAT. 1163 (1913),.28 U.S.C. 385 (1946).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Supp. 1952).
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Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, thought that the action was not
barred because:
".. . The fraud had as its object not merely to get the Court order,
but to get the money from the Court's custody. The contempt and the
fraud did not cease to operate so long as the money was being dis-
bursed in reliance upon it, and by virtue of its concealment." 86
In some cases the application of the continuing crime doctrine has led
to seemingly unsatisfactory results from the standpoint of the purposes of
statutes of limitations. For example, in State v. Ireland,"7 an architect
was convicted of creating a public nuisance when the structure which he
had designed contrary to a building code collapsed thirteen years after its
completion. Notwithstanding a two year limitation period, the court, by
holding the crime a continuing one, was able to affirm a conviction for a
thirteen year old crime. Even though the result in such a case may be
justified if the principal evidence of the crime is the collapse of the building,
the use of the "continuing crime" concept is at best questionable. It would
seem better to draft a longer limitations period for construction crimes
than to set dubious precedents by extensions of the continuing crime
doctrine.
Another illustration of a debatable application of the doctrine for
statute of limitations purposes is Fogel v. United States.88 An indictment
was filed on January 22, 1947 charging defendant with having wilfully
failed to register for the draft in 1942.89 Defendant was convicted despite
his claim that the three year statute of limitations 9o had run against the
alleged crime. The court reasoned that the crime was a continuing one,
because defendant bad a duty to register on the official registration day
and every day thereafter. One judge dissented on the grounds that the
initial failure to register was a completed crime, and that even though
subsequent failures to register were crimes in themselves, this did not affect
the statutory bar to prosecution for acts occurring before the three year
period: "The theory of the conviction is that by doing nothing he renewed
his crime every day to the date of trial; which amounts to saying there is
no statute of limitations for this offense." 91 An obvious difficulty with the
rule of the Fogel case would arise where the defense was that the defendant
did in fact register in 1942. Under such circumstances defendant would
be forced, contrary to the policy of the limitation statute, to produce evi-
86. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 422 (1940).
87. 126 N.J.L. 444, 20 A.2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1941). But ef. Hull v. London
County Council, [1901] 1 K.B. 580.
88. 162 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 791 (1947).
89. See Selective Training and Service Act, 55 STAT. 844 (1941), 50 U.S.C.
ApP. §302 (1946).
90. 18 U.S.C. §3282 (Supp. 1952).
91. Fogel v. United States, 162 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
791 (1947).
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dence on facts which occurred more than three years prior to the
indictment.
That the problem of the continuing crime is a perplexing one is illus-
trated by the foregoing cases. Despite the doctrine's validity in many
situations, it should be applied only on a limited scale; by applying the
doctrine loosely, courts have a potentially powerful weapon for the avoid-
ance of statutes of limitations.
TOLLING AND AVOIDING THE STATUTE
The existence of a statutory limitation on a crime does not mean that
it will be applied in every case in which that crime is alleged. A number
of exceptions are written into the statutes, and in addition to these excep-
tions there are some situations in which the statutes are not an effective
bar to prosecution. The most direct way of avoiding limitations would be
by legislative amendment to extend the period. Such an amendment does
not affect an individual for whom the statute has become a bar, on the
theory that to allow such an effect would constitute a violation of the pro-
hibition against ex post facto laws.92 However, where the statute has not
fully run, amendments which extend the period are permitted,9 a harsh
result for the individual who is within a few days of the bar. The various
methods of tolling and avoiding limitations merit discussion with a view to
determining the validity of these exceptions in the light of the purposes of
limitation statutes.
Statutory Exceptions
Practically every statute of limitations provides that the running of
the statute is tolled when certain circumstances occur, such as when an
indictment is found or when the defendant has fled the jurisdiction. In
addition, there was a wartime suspension of federal limitations on the
crime of defrauding the government.
Finding of an Indict-ment:-Generally, statutes of limitations are tolled
upon the finding of an indictment; 94 when the statute says only that the
prosecution shall "commence" at a particular time it has been held that the
statute is tolled by the filing of a complaint.9 5 This means that a statute of
limitations would give little assurance that the trial will be held when the
facts are fresh, except for the constitutional right to a speedy trial.98 The
fact that the evidence needed to obtain an indictment is usually noted in
the grand jury minutes does not compensate for tolling of the statute.
Since the defendant's witnesses and evidence are not brought before the
92. Black, Statutes of Limitation and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 26 Ky. L.J.
41 (1937).
93. Travis, Effect of Amendment Extending Period of Prosecution of Criminal
Actions, 7 IND. L.J. 230 (1932).
94. Guise v. State, 198 Ark. 767, 131 S.W.2d 631 (1939); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 255 Ky. 486, 74 S.W.2d 939 (1934).
95. State v. Gardner, 112 Conn. 121, 151 Atl. 349 (1930).
96. See notes 18, 19 and 20 supra.
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grand jury, the defendant is not present to cross-examine witnesses, and
grand jury minutes are not readily available to a defendant,9 7 any evidence
which is preserved by the grand jury proceedings tends only to harm the
defendant.
When an indictment is found the statute ceases to run until such time
as the indictment is quashed, dismissed, lost, mislaid, stolen or destroyed. 98
The fact that the statute resumes operation after one of the above occur-
rences serves as an inducement to the prosecution to remedy correctible
defects in its first indictment. This would not seem to impose great hard-
ship upon the prosecution even where the indictment was lost, stolen,
destroyed or quashed for a "technical" error (such as a misspelled name).
If the prosecution had sufficient facts and evidence to obtain the initial
indictment, the drawing of a new indictment or the correction of errors
will take little time.
Fleeing the Jurisdiction:-Many statutes provide for a tolling of the
statute when the defendant flees the jurisdiction. 9 To the extent that
most of the facts and evidence of the crime are within the knowledge and
control of the defendant, his absence from the jurisdiction is a great impedi-
ment to police investigation. This is particularly true of a first offender
whose modus operandi and possible associates are unknown to the police.
In addition, questioning of suspects is one of the most widely used means
of criminal investigation; such a procedure would undoubtedly be frus-
trated without the instant type of provision. This provision may be justi-
fied in that it removes an important cause for fleeing the jurisdiction, i.e.,
gaining the benefits of the statutory bar while at the same time receiving
possible sanctuary from investigation. 1° °
Closely related to the provisions concerning fleeing the jurisdiction are
those provisions that toll the statute when the fact of the crime is con-
cealed,10 1 or the offense or offender is unknown.'0 2 Such concealment
97. United States v. Violon, 173 Fed. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); See DEsSION,
CRimINAL LAw, ADmINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDm 933 (1948).
98. E.g., ILL ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 633 (Smith-Hurd 1935); A.A. CODE AN.
tit. 15, § 226 (1940). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. c. 24, § 932.05 (1944) (if the first
indictment is before the bar, and is quashed after the statute runs, the prosecution
has an added three months within which fo bring the second indictment). 18
U.S.C. §§3288, 3289 (Supp. 1952), provide that where an indictment is dismissed
because defective or insufficient, the statute of limitations does not bar the bringing
of a new indictment during the next succeeding regular term of court during which
a grand jury is in session.
99. E.g., DEL. REv. CODE tit. 11, §2903 (1953); NEB. REv. STAT. c. 29, § 110
(1948); N.H. REV. LAWS c. 427, § 13 (1942); OE. Comp. LA-ws ANN. § 26-203
(1940).
100. These considerations are mitigated to the extent that interstate cooperation
exists in the investigation of crimes. See also, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
9 U.L.A. 173, §2 (1942).
101. IND. STAT. ANN. §9-305 (Burns 1942); IAN. GEir. STAT. ANN. c. 62,
§ 504 (1935); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 11488 (Michie 1942).
102. GA. CoDE ANN. tit 27, § 601 (1953). As to whose knowledge is required
to start the statute, see Brown v. State, aff'd per curiain, 6 Ga. App. 329, 64 S.E.
1001 (1909); Cohen v. State, 2 Ga, App. 689, 59 S.E. 4 (1907). But cf., State
v. Watson, 145 Kan. 792, 67 P.2d 515 (1937).
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means more than mere "nondisclosure" and these provisions are strictly
interpreted in order to protect the defendant. The criterion laid down by
one court was:
"To constitute concealment it must appear that the statements or
conduct of the accused was calculated and designed to prevent dis-
covery of the crime with which he is charged; mere silence, inaction,
or nondisclosure is not enough." 103
Such provisions, although desirable to avoid the frustration of police in-
vestigation, weaken the evidence by extending the period.
Wartime Suspension:-The disruption of government investigatory
procedure during World War II led the Federal Government to consider
suspension of the federal statute of limitations. However, such a drastic
step was deemed unnecessary. 0 4 Suspension was limited to the crime of
defrauding the government which, because of its concealed nature, is par-
ticularly difficult to disclose.'0 5
Considerable litigation developed concerning the nature of the crime of
"defrauding the United States" as that term is used in the Code. In 1953
the Supreme Court in Bridges v. United States '0 6 finally decided the issue
by holding that the provision included only "pecuniary" or "property"
frauds. The majority of the Court relied both on the rule of statutory con-
struction that exceptions to a statute of limitations are to be strictly con-
strued,10 7 and on the legislative history '0 8 which indicated that Congress
was considering pecuniary frauds. The dissent illustrated the unreasonable-
ness of excluding other wartime frauds equally difficult to discover, stating:
"Certainly frauds impairing, obstructing or defeating selective service,
alien property, administration of prices and wages and the allotment of
scarce material, as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act, would
hardly be omitted knowingly by Congress from a suspension of limita-
tion for frauds against the Government. Yet many of these would
fall under the Court's interpretation. . . . It was as hard, perhaps
harder, to find and punish frauds against administration as those of a
pecuniary or property nature. A general amnesty bill against war
frauds would be fairer than to hold only those guilty of financial
frauds. Both the purpose and the language of the Suspension Act
103. State v. Watson, sipra note 102, at 794, 67 P.2d at 517.
104. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on HR.
4916, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1941).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (Supp. 1952).
106. 346 U.S. 209 (1953).
107. Id. at 216. See United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633 (1926); United
States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (1932).
108. H.R. REP. No. 365, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1921); S. REP. No. 1544,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 2051, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2
(1942) ; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 4916, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1941).
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lead to the conclusion that frauds against administration are within
its scope." 109
Since there were no additional resources available to aid governmental
investigation during the war, suspending the statute of limitations was not
merely a collateral solution as in the case of the usual overburdened
prosecutor. 110 The Federal Government was logically faced with only two
alternatives: the suspension of the statute, or the possibility of allowing
many violators to escape prosecution.
Treatment of Juveniles
A special problem exists as to whether criminal statutes of limitations
apply to those within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. There is no
case law on point and the statutes do not specifically deal with the problem.
The argument against applying time limitations to juvenile proceedings is
based on the fact that juvenile offenders receive statutory treatment differ-
ing from that designed for ordinary criminals."' The juvenile court judge
has much broader discretionary powers than the judge in an ordinary
criminal case. The purpose of juvenile procedure is to treat and re-
habilitate the minor without concern for retribution. It would, therefore,
seem that if a judge determines that a minor having committed a past
offense has since become a law abiding citizen, the minor would be dis-
missed. Since juvenile proceedings are generally not open to the public,
the mere fact that the minor is brought in will not result in the community
attitudes which usually accompany the criminal prosecution of the ordinary
defendant. It is thus arguable that there is no need for a statute of limita-
tions where juveniles are concerned. The same factors may have led to
the statutory provisions which deny to a juvenile the right to such protec-
tions as jury trials and preliminary hearings." 2
On the other hand, the mere fact that juvenile proceedings do not have
all of the attributes of the ordinary criminal trial does not necessarily mean
that the area should be free from statutes of limitations. The fact that the
judge has broad discretion offers great opportunity for abuse; the fact that
proceedings are behind closed doors eliminates the natural check on un-
fairness provided by public attention; problems of the reliability of evi-
dence are still present. While application of a statute of limitations in these
cases would provide a check on arbitrary action by the juvenile court, such
109. 346 U.S. 209, 230 (1953) (Court's footnotes omitted). In 1951 Congress
enlarged the limitation for Naturalization Act violations from three years (which
was a reduction from the prior five year limit of the 1948 revision) to ten years.
18 U.S.C. § 3291 (Supp. 1952).
110. See text following note 21 supra.
111. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243 et seq. (Purdon 1939); N.Y. CHIL-
DREN'S COURT AcT § 14. For studies of juvenile court laws in general, see Mack,
The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Rxv. 104 (1909); CoNsuLicH, JuvENmLE COURT
LAvs OF THE UNrrED STATEs, (2d ed. 1939). See also, Van Waters, The Sociali-
zation of Juvenile Court Procedure, 13 J. Cmem. L. & CRImiNoLoGy 61 (1922).
112. Ibid.
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a provision would not seem to impede the purpose of Juvenile Court Acts."83
Moreover, in situations where a statute of limitations would be relevant, it
is probable that treatment of the minor is unwarranted."14
Waiver
In addition to express or implied exceptions to the statutes, the ques-
tion arises as to whether a defendant may waive the protection of the bar
by his conduct. The case law on this subject, though scanty, indicates that
a waiver will result from a plea of guilty to an indictment which appears
to be barred by the statute. 15 The decisions concern themselves mainly
with questions of the proper procedure by which the issue of the bar is
raised and proved."16 Little consideration, if any, is given to the question
of whether the public policy that gave rise to the statute should permit
waiver under any circumstances. 117  One answer to this question might
be that one the facts are admitted, the statute is unnecessary for evi-
dentiary purposes. However, a plea of guilty here, as well as generally,
is only as efficacious as it is accurate and therefore the unreliability of
evidence because of passage of time is an essential consideration despite
such a plea.
Perjury and the Limitation Statutes
The now famous case of United States v. Hiss "18 illustrates the prob-
lem of the use of an indictment for perjury as a means of allaying the con-
sequences of statutes of limitations. In that case, defendant was indicted
for perjury in falsely testifying to his part in alleged espionage activities,
prosecution for which was barred by the statute of limitations. Without
considering the merits of the factual issues presented, it is clear that the
defendant was forced to rely for his defense to the perjury charge upon
the same facts and evidence which would have constituted his defense to
the barred espionage charge. Similarly, the prosecution was relying upon
evidence which the statute of limitations on espionage was designed to
exclude. It is important to note, however, that perjury convictions require
113. See the American Law Institute's proposed Youth Court Act which pro-
vides: "Every person charged with a violation of law and within the jurisdiction
of the Youth Court is entitled to . . . all . . . rights, privileges and immunities
which he would have under the laws of this state if he were an adult proceded
against in a criminal court upon charge of a similar violation of law." A.L.I.,
YoUTH CouaR AcT § 34 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1940).
114. One judge in the Philadelphia Municipal Court who handles juvenile
cases indicated that a child who appeared before him and whose only misconduct
took place a number of years in excess of the statutory period would not be sub-
jected to any treatment.
115. State v. Brinkley, 193 N.C. 747, 138 S.E. 138 (1927); Commonwealth
ex rel. Patterson v. Ashe, 154 Pa. Super. 397, 36 A.2d 249 (1943).
116. People v. Blake, 121 App. Div. 613, 106 N.Y. Supp. 319 (1st Dep't 1907);
United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168, 179 (U.S. 1872).
117. But cf., 1 Os. Arr'y GEN. 383, 384 (1820).
118. 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
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the testimony of two witnesses or one witness and corroborating evidence,
thus diminishing the use of circumstantial evidence." 9 To this extent the
burden on the prosecution may be greater than in the proof of the sub-
stantive crime.
Since prosecutions for perjury are essential insofar as they seek to
insure the giving of accurate and reliable testimony in proceedings of public
importance, it might be argued that the fact that an occasional defendant
is convicted of lying about a crime barred by the statute of limitations does
not warrant concern. Whether or not such an argument has merit under
conditions where perjury prosecutions are few and far between, the fact
is that today there is an ominous use of perjury indictments against per-
sons who have allegedly lied about acts barred from prosecution by the
statutes of limitations. Consider the statement of Professor Zechariah
Chafee:
"I am disturbed by the growing use of perjury prosecutions to bypass
the Statute of Limitations. One of the main purposes of this statute
is to protect innocent persons who might not be able to defend them-
selves against a charge of an antiquated crime, because of the difficulty
of digging up recollections and documents about events a dozen years
old, especially when they seemed of no importance at the time. Getting
a man prosecuted for perjury if the grand jury happens to disagree
with his memory of events long buried appears to be legally valid but
it is nothing to be proud of." 120
To a great extent, the controversy over such use of perjury can be
attributed to the growing importance of legislative investigations and the
wide area within which they may operate.' 2 ' *Where the scope of inter-
rogation covers a long period of time prior to the investigation, the witness
must recall events which the statute of limitations recognizes as being too
old to warrant criminal prosecution.122  Legislative committees, of course,
must be allowed wide access to facts so that they can perform legislative
functions in the most informed manner possible. It would be untenable to
suggest that the information available to legislative bodies be limited to
119. United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951).
120. CHAFEE, THIRTY-FWE YEARS WITH FRxEDom OF SPEECH 28-9 (1952).
121. "So that even as to ordinary subjects, the power of inquiry by the legisla-
ture is co-extensive with the power of legislation and is not limited to the scope or
the content of contemplated legislation .... [T]he possibility that invalid .as
well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power of
inquiry. . . ." Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
See also Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (neither house of
Congress possesses a "general power of making inquiry into private affairs of the
citizen") ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1926) ; Landis. Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HAgv. L. Rxv. 153 (1926).
122. For example, Owen Lattimore, when interrogated by the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee, was questioned as to his knowledge that one Asiaticus was
a Communist in the late 1930's. His answer to this question, inter alia, was the
basis of a perjury indictment. See United States v. Lattimore, 122 F. Supp. 507
(D.D.C. 1953); 102 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 251 (1953).
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any particular period of time; the purpose of a statute of limitations in
protecting an individual from prosecution on the basis of ancient evidence
does not call for a restriction of the facts upon which legislation may be
based.
Therefore, where the purpose of the investigation is to seek a founda-
tion for legislation, it is probable that the extent to which statutes of limita-
tions are by-passed is outweighed by the need for honest testimony as
guaranteed by the perjury sanction. On the other hand, if the investigation
is aimed at particular individuals rather than legislative goals 123 the balance
would seem to shift to the protection of the individuals intended by the
statutes of limitations. In the latter case the circumvention of the statutes
appears to be a principal purpose of the investigation; in the former,
circumvention occurs as a collateral incident to the investigatory purpose.
A practical method of resolving the conflict between perjury charges
and the statutes of limitations is difficult to formulate. At least in the area
of legislative investigations, the answer appears to be in the hope for self-
restraint on the part of the legislators and prosecutors; or perhaps in a
reexamination of legislative controls limiting the powers and functions of
the investigators.
CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitations are, to some degree, in conflict with the deter-
rence and retribution aims of the criminal law. However, it seems clear
that such statutes are essential in a system of criminal law which is de-
signed to afford to individuals the utmost protection from unjust prosecu-
tion. This need has been recognized to the extent that most states have
adopted statutory limitations for all but the most serious crimes; unfor-
tunately, the existing statutes seem to have been drafted with little con-
sideration of the aims which the limitations should achieve, that is, the
assurance of a maximum degree of availability and reliability of evidence
consonant with an adequate allowance of time for investigation and prose-
cution. Furthermore, the development of exceptions and devices for avoid-
ing the statutes has curtailed the protection which such statutes should offer.
The most disturbing aspect of this area of the law is the apparent lack
of consideration of the many problems raised by the present statutes, as
evidenced by the paucity of authoritative discussion and investigation. A
rational system of limitations, designed to prevent convictions where per-
tinent evidence is unavailable or unreliable because of the passage of time,
cannot be established until scientific analysis of the relationships of time
to evidentiary needs, and the factors relevant to efficient investigation and
disclosure of each type of criminal activity, is made available to the
legislatures.
123. For discussions of committee technique see COUNTRYMAN, UN-AMERICAN
AcTrmIV s IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1951); OGDEN, THE DIES Com=ITTEE
(1945); CARR, THE HOUSE CobtMrrrEE ON UN-AMEmcAN Acrivrris (1952).
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